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This study investigates the micro effects of macro news using customer price-contingent orders 
(i.e. stop-loss and take-profit orders) data from a large foreign exchange dealing bank in the 
pound/dollar market. Results reveal that price-contingent order placement intensifies 3 to 5 hours 
prior to the news  events.  I examine the link between this surge in order placement  and the 
exchange-rate jump following the announcement. I find that price-contingent orders can enhance 
our  ability  to  explain  post-release  exchange-rate  returns  by  half.  Furthermore,  the  estimated 
effect of orders is orthogonal to the news surprises. This implies that there may be a component 
of  the  news  response  that  purely  reflects  institutional  features  such  as  order  types  and  not 
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1.   Introduction 
 News is an important source of exchange-rate volatility. Indeed, Evans and Lyons (2003) 
find that news accounts for about thirty percent of total price variance. In earlier studies
1, and 
more recently in Andersen et al. (2003, 2005), it is presumed that the response to news is entirely 
a reaction to its information content. That is, the exchange-rate response is monotonically related 
to the surprise component of the news through its effects on expected future exchange rates or on 
discount rates. These news studies do not attempt to trace the mechanism through which news 
brings about an exchange-rate change. In a world of rational expectations and perfectly shared 
information,  the  news  could  theoretically  bring  about  an  instantaneous  change  without  any 
unusual trading activity. However, recent empirical studies indicate that trading activity is an 
important link between news and its associated exchange-rate response. Love and Payne (2002), 
for example, estimate that on average over half of the price adjustment to news comes via order 
flow. Evans and Lyons (2003) further suggest that about two-thirds of the increase in exchange-
rate volatility associated with new public information is transmitted indirectly via order flow, 
with the rest being the direct impounding of news into prices with no need for trading. 
In  this  paper,  I  suggest  that  the  exchange  rate’s  response  to  scheduled  news 
announcements, and in particular, the component of the response mediated through order flow, 
does  not  entirely  reflect  the  announcements’  information  content.  Instead,  there  may  be  a 
component of the response that purely reflects order flow and is orthogonal to the information 
itself. This order flow is specifically the price-contingent order flow, in which a trade’s execution 
is contingent upon the rate reaching a pre-specified threshold. More explicitly, a stop-loss buy 
(sell) order instructs the dealer to purchase the currency once the market rate rises (falls) to a 
certain level; a take profit buy (sell) instructs the dealer to buy the currency when the market rate 
falls (rises) to the threshold level. Stop-loss orders, which involve positive feedback trading, can 
create rapid, self-reinforcing price movements. Osler (2005) provides evidence of such “price 
cascades” using the clustering patterns of stop-loss orders around round numbers to identify the 
points where they are likely to be triggered. As suggested by their name, stop-loss orders can be 
used to protect existing positions. They can also be used to hedge options positions and to ensure 
that new positions are opened in a timely manner. These orders are primarily used by financial 
end-users.  
                                                 
1 See also, for example, Cornell (1982), Engel and Frankel (1984), Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Hardouvelis 
(1988), Klein (1991), and Ederington and Lee (1995).   2 
Take-profit orders, on the other hand, which generate negative-feedback trading, are not 
triggered  in  waves  and  hence  do  not  result  in  price  cascades.  They  are  primarily  used  by 
commercial end-users, i.e. importers and exporters, who trade for non-speculative reasons and 
have some flexibility in timing their trades (Bessembinder 1994, Foucault 1999).  
Stop-loss and take-profit orders are not included in any exchange-rate models and were 
not discussed in the foreign exchange literature until Osler (2003). Nonetheless the relevance of 
order form to price movements is familiar to those in finance. Easley and O’Hara (1991), for 
example, develops a model in which stop-loss orders increase the probability of large, discrete 
price movements. 
The significance of stop-loss and take-profit orders in the macro news context stems from 
the rapid reaction of exchange rates to news releases; in fact, the market absorbs the majority of 
the news within 5 minutes (Andersen et al. (2003), Cheung and Chinn, (2001)). These large 
moves can be expected to trigger price-contingent orders, which could in turn modify the quality 
of the overall response. If stop-loss orders dominate the triggered orders, the response could be 
magnified. If take-profit orders dominate, the response could be muted. 
The  paper  elucidates  this  interplay  between  the  institutional  features  of  the  currency 
market and the fundamental macroeconomic information flow. The investigation has two main 
pieces. First, I examine order placement patterns in the hours prior to economic announcements. 
Second, I examine the effects of price-contingent orders on the exchange-rate response to news. I 
carry out the analysis using 21 months of pound/dollar price-contingent orders provided by the 
Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  (RBS,  formerly  NatWest  Markets)  and  data  on  the  U.S.  scheduled 
macroeconomic news announcements. 
Regarding news-related patterns in order submission, my main result is that stop-loss 
order placement intensifies substantially in the hours leading up to the announcement time. By 
contrast, take-profit order placement remains normal before the news release but intensifies four 
hours afterwards. This pattern is fully consistent with agent rationality. Given the dramatic and 
rapid potential exchange-rate response to news, investors may wish to protect existing positions 
by ensuring that their losses will not greatly exceed a given amount. Carrying out a deal always 
takes time due to the sequence of events necessary to complete the transaction, and when dealers 
are busy in the post-announcement period it could take even more time. By placing stop-loss 
orders before the news events, they can be assured of liquidating their position quickly when 
their loss limit is reached. Customers wishing to take profits, on the other hand, will rationally 
prefer to wait until the rate has stopped moving. Since announcements are followed by sudden   3 
drastic exchange-rate jumps, it is quite possible that the market price goes beyond an order's 
specified  price  (below  the  price  for  the  buy  order  or  above  the  price  for  the  sell  order). 
Customers looking to take profits are therefore wise to delay submitting take-profit orders until 
the market calms down. This is exactly what we see in the data. 
To analyze the effects of price-contingent orders on the exchange-rate's response to news, 
I first estimate a contemporaneous news response model that measures the exchange-rate's five-
minute reaction to news surprises normalized by their standard deviation. The estimated news 
coefficients are similar to those in Andersen et al. (2003). Then, I augment this baseline model 
by adding excess stop-loss and take-profit orders, measured as the difference between orders 
placed in three hours previous to news events and normal level of orders placed during those 
hours.
2 
The results indicate that price-contingent order flow makes a substantial contribution to 
the exchange-rate's response to news.  In particular, stop-loss orders intensify the  reaction of 
exchange  rates  to  news,  as  one  would  anticipate.  Take-profit  orders  have  no  statistically 
significant  effect.  The  lack  of  significance  is  not  surprising  in  light  of  the  absence  of  any 
tendency for agents to intensify the placement of these orders before the news.  
When orders are included in the returns regression our ability to explain post-release 
exchange-rate returns rises by 12 percent. Furthermore, as news become more surprising, the 
impact of the excess stop-loss orders increases. I interpret this in terms of price cascades. Big 
surprise events tend to generate large price reactions, creating a wave of stop order executions, 
which  in  turn  intensifies  the  overall  exchange-rate  response  to  news.  Allowing  for  such 
interactions  between  news  surprise  size  and  price-contingent  order  flow  increases  the 
explanatory power of the baseline model more than half.  
Interestingly,  the  estimated  effect  of  the  news  surprises  themselves  is  robust  to  the 
inclusion of order variables. This reflects the orthogonality of order placement to the news itself, 
which I document separately. Together, these results indicate that a substantial portion of the 
exchange-rate's response to news is unrelated to the information content of that news. 
The paper also tests for asymmetry in the response to "good" news and "bad" news. 
Consistent with Andersen et al. (2003), I find only weak evidence for asymmetry. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 explains the 
intraday patterns in order placement. Section 4 presents the statistical methodology and the main 
                                                 
2 I apply the same model to four and five hour intervals and found qualitatively similar results although the magnitude of order 
coefficients declines slightly as the length of the intervals increases. See the robustness check section for coefficient estimates.    4 
results.  Section  5  tests  for  asymmetries  in  the  price  response  to  news.  Section  6  provides 
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
2.   Data: Currency Orders and News  
A. Currency Orders: Background and Descriptive Statistics 
1.  Background 
Stop-loss and take-profit orders are price-contingent orders. The execution of these orders 
is contingent upon the rate crossing a pre-specified threshold. More specifically, a stop-loss buy 
(sell) order instructs the dealer to purchase currency once the market rate rises (falls) to a certain 
level; a take-profit buy (sell), on the other hand, instructs a dealer to buy the currency when the 
exchange rate falls (rises) to the threshold level. Stop-loss orders are associated with positive 
feedback  trading  since  price  declines  (rises)  trigger  execution  of  stop-loss  sell  (buy)  orders, 
which  contribute  to  the  downward  (upward)  trend  in  prices.  By  contrast,  take-profit  orders 
involve negative feedback trading since price declines (rises) trigger execution of take-profit buy 
(sell) orders, which halts or reverses the initial downward (upward) movement in prices. Price-
contingent orders are executed at the market rate and the requested amount is inevitably filled, 
albeit at a possibly worse price than that specified in the order
3. 
The term aggregate order flow, as used here, will refer to more than just stop-loss and 
take-profit orders, it includes limit orders and deals. Deals comprise the majority of all trades and 
involve one agent—either a customer or another dealing bank—trading at a quote provided by a 
dealer. Hence, with a deal, there is no "order" as normally defined (Osler and Savaser 2004). The 
share of executed price-contingent market orders in total deal flow is small (about 5% or less, 
according to practitioner estimates). However, since the foreign exchange market is the biggest 
in the world, on the order of 1.9 trillion dollars in daily turnover, even a small share of the deal 
flow sums to a massive amount (BIS 2004). Furthermore, these orders can generate amplified 
price  effects  distinguishable  from  other  order  forms  as  demonstrated  in  Easley  and  O’Hara 
(1991), Osler (2005). Easley and O’Hara (1991) models the effect of price-contingent orders on 
security market performance and shows that stop-loss orders increase the probability of large 
price movements. By demonstrating their clustering pattern around round numbers, Osler (2005) 
provides evidence from currency markets that stop-loss orders can create rapid, self-reinforcing 
price movements.  
                                                 
3 This is where price-contingent orders differ from limit orders. Price-contingent orders have a flexible requested price, and a 
fixed amount. A limit order, however, does not necessarily fill the requested amount if there is not enough supply at the specified 
rate.   5 
2.  Descriptive Statistics: 
The orders data are provided by the Royal Bank of Scotland. It includes 10,413 orders 
with an aggregate value in excess of $61.7 billion. The data cover all pound/dollar orders in two 
distinct  periods:  September  8,  1999  through  April  11,  2000  and  12  June,  2001  through  20 
September, 2002. During this time, the bank received an average of 21 new price-contingent 
orders per day in the pound/dollar currency pair. The dataset presents information about each 
order’s time of placement, requested execution rate, and order amount. Twenty eight percent of 
orders were actually executed, the rest were either deleted or remained open at the end of the 
sample period. 
Stop-loss  orders  constitute  48  percent  of  all  orders  in  the  sample.  The  distribution 
between buy and sell orders for pound/dollar pair is also even (Table 2a). However, there is an 
asymmetry between stop-loss and take-profit orders regarding the buy-sell ratios: The share of 
sell (sell dollars) orders is 53% in stop-loss and 44% in take-profit sample. These figures are in 
line with the observed strength of pound vis-à-vis the dollar in the sample period. During this 
time, the US entered into a recessionary period and pound (along with the Swiss Frank) appeared 
as  a  safer  alternative  to  the  US  dollar,  creating  an  increase  in  demand  for  the  sterling. 
Consequently, more sell orders are placed in the stop-loss category to limit losses due to the 
downward market trend. The opposite is true for the take-profit category due to the option-like 
properties of these orders. In bad times, placing a take-profit buy is more profitable since it gives 
the investor the opportunity to enter the market at a favorable lower rate.  
The majority of orders, 61 percent, were placed by customers; of these, two thirds were 
placed by financial customers (Table 3a). Since this dealing bank is a large player in the U.K. 
pound market, which transacts with every major type of customer, the orders placed with the 
bank should be representative of the market-wide population of customer orders. Osler (2003) 
states  that  price-contingent  orders  executed  for  customers  may  represent  on  the  order  of  15 
percent of all customer business
4.  
This paper investigates  the high frequency price-adjustment to macro news given the 
characteristics of price-contingent orders. This renders the “near” orders the primary focus of the 
study. Therefore, orders placed farther away from the market rate are excluded from the dataset 
since these orders have no immediate price consequence due to their near-zero likelihood of 
                                                 
4 This figure is based on the finding that the customer orders account for 61 percent of all price-contingent orders (Table 3a) and 
also on the informal estimates given by the bank, stating that customer deals represent on the order of 20 percent of all deals at 
this bank (by value) and that executed price-contingent orders represent on the order of five percent of deal flow (Osler 2002).   6 
execution at the time of their placement.   The  distance of an order from the market rate is 
compared against the standard deviation of daily absolute exchange-rate changes, which is 0.004 
in this sample.  If the difference between the trigger rate  and the market rate  at the time of 
submission exceeds 0.004, the observation is considered as “far” and dropped from the sample
5. 
The descriptive statistics of the near orders are qualitatively similar to those of the full-sample, 
except that near orders have a much higher rate of execution than far orders (Table 2b and 3b).                            
  The exchange-rate quotes corresponding to the orders in the bank’s record book are from 
Reuters. They are computed as the mid-point of the bid and ask prices sampled at five-minute 
intervals.  
B. Macroeconomic News  
  The news data provided by Money Market Services (MMS) consist of the declared values 
of macroeconomic fundamentals along with the forecasts of the traders in anticipation of those 
releases. Matching the orders dataset, the news data cover the period from September 8, 1999 
through April 11, 2000 and 12 June, 2001 through 20 September, 2002. This study focuses on 
U.S  announcements  scheduled  for  8:30  EST.  All  8:30  announcements  are  included  in  the 
analysis (Table 1). Since most of the important macroeconomic news is announced at 8:30, this 
constraint does not limit the relevance of the results
6.  
There are legitimate concerns regarding the redundancy of some of these news items. For 
instance, PPI declaration always precedes that of CPI. Since the two series are highly correlated, 
the new information content of the latter is typically quite low compared to PPI. Andersen et al. 
(2003)  shows  that  only  a  handful  of  the  macro  news  announcements  (payroll  employment, 
durable goods orders, trade balance, initial unemployment claims, NAPM index, retail sales, 
consumer confidence, and advance GDP) have statistically significant price effects (Table 1). 
Hence, the general practice in the macro news literature is to focus primarily on these significant 
news releases (Chaboud et al., 2004, Love and Payne, 2002). Therefore, my main results apply to 
the significant announcement sample which contains all the 8:30 news that were found to be 
significant by Andersen et al. (2003) for the pound/dollar currency pair. The unrestricted sample 
results are reported as a robustness check.  
                                                 
5 I also exclude all trades during weekends and major holidays due to unusually light volume: December 24-December 26, 
December 31-January 2, Good Friday, Easter Monday, Memorial Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and the following day, and July 
4 (or, if this is on a weekend, the day on which the Independence Day holiday is observed).  
6 With 21 months of price-contingent orders data, there are not enough observations to conduct statistical analysis of other 
scheduled announcement times since only one or two news series are released at those times. 10:00 EST is an exception with a 
total of 5 releases and is analyzed in the robustness check section.     7 
To measure the unexpected component of each announcement, which is the part that 
matters for price adjustment, I calculate the standardized news surprise as follows:  









=                                          (1) 
where Akt is the announced value of indicator k, Ekt is the market expected value of indicator k, 
which is measured as the median forecast from the MMS survey, and  ˆk σ is the sample standard 
deviation of Akt - Ekt. Every Friday MMS collects the forecasts of about forty money managers 
regarding all the indicators scheduled to be released the following week. 
3.   Intraday Patterns in Price-Contingent Order Placement  
In  this  section,  I  discuss  why  people  place  price-contingent  orders  in  general  and 
especially around macro news announcements by focusing on intraday order placement patterns. 
The  well-known  finding  regarding  these  patterns  is  that  investors  place  more  orders  on 
announcement days. This is shown in Figure 1, which plots the average number of orders placed 
with the bank for six hours before and after the 8:30 announcements. The mean number of orders 
placed  on  days  when  there  are  no  8:30  announcements  is  also  shown  as  a  benchmark 
(henceforth, called the “no-announcement days”).  
On an average announcement day, the bank receives a total of 22 stop-loss and take-
profit orders. On no-announcement days, this number is 20. In the restricted sample of near 
orders,  the  corresponding  figures  are  10  and  8  respectively
7.  Since  the  orders  in  this  study 
constitute only a small subset of the entire market (about 5% or less), an educated guess for the 
market-wide averages would be around 200 and 160 with 40 extra orders on announcement days. 
These statistics imply that the increase in near order placements is the driving force behind the 
rise in overall order submission on announcement days and confirms the appropriateness of the 
far order cutoff used above.  
The key result of the section is that the two order types follow different intraday patterns. 
Figures 2 and 3, which disaggregate orders into stop-loss and take-profit categories, portray this 
behavior: Stop-loss order placement intensifies substantially 3-5 hours before the news event; 
once  the  news  is  announced,  the  surge  disappears  immediately
8.  This  is  consistent  with  the 
protective and speculative motivations of the financial end-users, who typically place stop orders 
to avoid costs associated with transacting a deal after the news releases. Take-profit orders, on 
                                                 
7 The difference in daily totals is statistically significant at the 1% level for near orders and at the 10% level for the full sample. 
8 Stop-loss order submission is higher relative to the benchmark on announcement days before 8:30 and this is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (except the 1-hour interval immediately preceding the release).   8 
the other hand, do not appear to intensify prior to news releases reflecting the risk of these orders 
being picked off by the news-induced exchange-rate jump at an inferior price. We see that take-
profit order placement picks up only after the news-induced volatility dampens (Figure 3).  
One  important  determinant  that  gives  rise  to  the  observed  intraday  order  placement 
patterns is the characteristics of the investors. Commercial investors, for instance, are mostly 
exporters  and  importers  who  frequently  need  to  carry  out  currency  conversions  to  make 
payments on specific due dates. Provided that the transaction occurs within the day they specify, 
these firms can wait to transact if they think they can get a better price (Admati and Pfleiderer 
1988; Harris 1998; Osler 2002). Due to the nature of their business, it is costly for them to 
monitor the market actively and carry out a deal at the appropriate time. Besides, carrying out 
any deal takes time: First, a customer calls a salesperson requesting a two-way quote. The sales 
person relays the request to the interbank dealers, who provide a two-way quote based on market 
conditions, their own inventory position, and other relevant information. The sales person then 
communicates the quote to the customer, who chooses whether to buy at the quoted offer, sell at 
the  quoted  bid,  or  decline  to  deal  altogether  (Osler,  2003).  Instead,  commercial  customers 
delegate this duty to the dealer by placing price-contingent orders. Moreover, monitoring the 
market is costly even for financial end-users. A small lag in placement or execution can result in 
significant price risk because of the high speed of the market. Hence, the common rationale of 
reducing monitoring costs and trading frictions underlies the use of price-contingent orders by 
commercial and financial investors alike.  
The types of orders investors typically place depend on the nature of their business. For 
instance, financial customers place more stop-loss orders relative to take-profit orders (Table 3b). 
This behavior is partly due to their protective and speculative motives and partly due to the 
frequent use of overnight loss limits by financial customers. Loss limits are assigned to dealers 
by their employing institutions to avoid principal-agent problems since employers who invest in 
risky assets have to rely on the expertise of the dealers who have only limited liability (Bensaid 
and De Bandt 2000).  
Commercial end-users, on the other hand, place more take-profit orders. The option-like 
properties of take-profit orders make them attractive for these investors, whose execution needs 
are not as immediate as financial customers (Foucault 1999). To illustrate this point, suppose 
there is a conversion that needs to be made for a payment on a specific date and suppose that the 
firm places a buy order below the current market price. If the rate decreases to the requested rate 
sometime within the day, the corporate customer is better off placing a take-profit buy order   9 
instead of just placing a market order at 9:00am when they first come in the office. As soon as 
the market rate reaches the requested rate, the customer takes the profit and leaves the market 
with enough currency to make its payment on its due date. Commercial customers do not have to 
transact immediately. They trade immediacy with the possibility of a trade at a better price by 
using take-profit orders. 
The significance of stop-loss and take-profit orders in the macro news context stems from 
the rapid reaction of exchange rates to news releases. Andersen et al. (2003) shows that returns 
adjust  to  news  very  fast,  within  5  minutes,  whereas  exchange-rate  volatility  adjusts  only 
gradually after an hour. Therefore, financial investors, who primarily care about the returns - as 
opposed  to  levels-  of  exchange  rates  would  prefer  to  trade  immediately  following  an 
announcement. This way, they can take advantage of the sudden jump in the exchange rate. 
However, because carrying out a deal in the post-announcement period takes time due to the 
sequence of events necessary to complete the transaction, these investors tend to place their 
orders, which are mainly stop-loss orders, before the news events. This way, they can be assured 
of entering the market quickly, which is exactly what we see in Figure 2. 
Contrary to financial customers, commercial investors’ primary concern is the exchange-
rate  level  at  which  their  transaction  occurs.  They  are  not  in  a  rush  to  enter  the  market 
immediately following the news release since they are not driven by the sudden news-induced 
jump in return. Therefore, commercial customers, who typically place take-profit orders, do not 
seek to submit orders before announcements. Moreover, it is not in their interest to do so. News 
announcements are followed by sudden drastic exchange-rate jumps.  Hence, it is quite possible 
that the market price goes beyond the specified order price (below the price for the buy order or 
above the price for the sell order) creating the risk of the take-profit order being “picked-off” at 
an inferior price
9. In such a situation, it would be a better strategy to wait until the market calms 
down, which is what we observe in Figure 3. 
4.   Exchange Rates, Fundamentals and Price-Contingent Orders 
A. Impact on Returns: Directional Effects 
In this section, I estimate the contribution of the rise in pre-announcement order flow to 
the subsequent exchange-rate movements. First, I begin with a baseline model which treats the 
news surprise as the only source of exchange-rate variation. Then, I add signed price-contingent 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed discussion of the risk of being picked off in the context of limit orders, see Foucault (1999), 
Carlson and Lo (2004).   10 
order variables, measured as the difference between orders placed in three hours prior to the 
news events and the normal level of orders placed during those hours: 
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Here, Rt is the 5-minute log return from 8:30 to 8:35 on any given news day t. Newskt is the 
standardized news corresponding to announcement k at day t (k = 1, …,6 (Table 1)). Dkt is equal 
to 1 if announcement k is released on day t, zero otherwise. SLS-TPB represents the number of 
stop-loss  sell  minus  take-profit  buy  orders,  in  excess  of  the  no-announcement  day  sample 
average, placed within 3 hours before the announcement. SLB-TPS is defined similarly. A more 
general regression equation, which includes SLS, SLB, TPS, TPB separately, seems better a 
priori; I use this method to save degrees of freedom. This is a concise method of grouping the 
order  variables  which  are  activated  by  a  given  directional  move.  An  exchange-rate  decline 
triggers  stop-loss  sells  and  take-profit  buys  rendering  stop-loss  buys  and  take-profit  sells 
irrelevant. Since these two order types pull in opposite directions, the net effect is the difference 
between  them.  Depending  on  whether  the  news  surprise  is  one  that  tends  to  appreciate  or 
depreciate the currency, I impose a zero restriction on the irrelevant orders. For instance, if the 
news surprise is positive (i.e. indicative of currency appreciation), then the stop-loss sell and 
take-profit buys assume the value zero. Therefore, in this specification, the respective expected 
signs of SLB-TPS and SLS-TPB parameters are positive and negative. OLS regressions and 
standard  errors  are  calculated  with  Newey-West  correction  for  autocorrelation  and 
heteroskedasticity. 
Table 4 provides estimates from the baseline and Andersen et al. (2005) specifications as 
a  reference  point.  In  the  latter,  authors  have  enough  statistical  power  to  run  the  following 
regression on each individual announcement separately:  
                                         Rt = βk Newskt + εt                                      (4) 
The contemporaneous news response estimates and R
2’s in Andersen et al. (2005) are based on 
futures markets spanning 10 years, from 1992 to 2002. The news estimates here are consistently 
at the same order of magnitude as theirs and in some instances almost exactly identical to the 
coefficients they report (e.g. retail sales). Furthermore, our results accord well with their finding 
that employment news has the largest price impact. A one-standard deviation nonfarm payroll   11 
employment  surprise  tends  to  depreciate  (if  negative)  the  dollar against  the  pound  by  0.085 
percent in the baseline model and 0.098 percent in Andersen et al. (2005). Trade balance and 
GDP advance release are the other two news items with the strongest price effect.  
In the orders-augmented regression, we see that an additional stop-loss sell in excess of 
take-profit buy orders tends to depreciate the dollar against the pound by 0.025 percent. This is 
larger than the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in jobless claims. The negative and 
significant coefficient is consistent with the expected sign of the net stop-loss sell order. Net 
stop-loss buy orders have the expected positive coefficient, but lack the statistical significance at 
the 10% level. I discuss this asymmetry later in section 5.  
Price-contingent  orders  are  most  influential  when  the news  is  most  surprising.  Large 
news surprises tend to generate large exchange rate reactions and trigger the execution of stop-
loss orders. Due to the positive feedback trading effect, once these orders are triggered, they 
propagate the initial trend, which then leads to the execution of more stop-loss orders generating 
an even bigger price movement. To test this hypothesis, I interact the stop-loss orders with the 
six surprise size variables creating 12 variables spanning two directions per each of the 6 news 
items. Then, I add them to the order-augmented specification in equation 3. The results reveal 
that interaction terms are significant for the news announcements with greatest impact—payroll 
employment and trade balance. Therefore, in Table 4, I report those interaction coefficients only. 
Price-contingent  order  flow  intensifies  the  impact  of  news  considerably:  A  one-standard 
deviation increase in U.S. employment surprise, if negative, exacerbates the depreciation of the 
dollar against the pound due to a stop-loss sell order by 0.226 percent. Hence, the slight decline 
in the individual estimates of the employment and stop-loss sell orders compared to the order-
augmented regression is more than compensated by the large interaction coefficient.  
Overall,  including  interaction  terms  improves  the  explanatory  power  of  the  base  line 
models considerably: The adjusted-R
2 increases from 26 percent to 40 percent enhancing our 
ability to explain price adjustment to news by more than half.  
An alternative way of test whether stop-loss order effect depends on how surprising the 
announcement is, is to partition the sample into two according to the size of the standardized 
news  surprises.  On  days  with  more  than  one  announcement  released  at  the  same  time,  the 
surprise variables are aggregated using their estimated news response coefficients as weights to 
account  for  possible  counteracting  price  effects.    If  the  absolute  value  of  the  standardized 
surprise variable is smaller (larger) than the sample median, the observation belongs to the small 
(large) surprise sample. Table 5 shows that the estimated effect of stop-loss sell orders in excess   12 
of buy orders is 0.049 percent for large surprises but only 0.008 percent for the small ones. This 
difference in effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and provides further support 
for the claim that stop-loss orders tend to generate larger price movements when news is most 
surprising.  
The novelty in Table 5 is that news coefficients are also larger in the large news sample. 
One might conjecture that larger news coefficients in the large surprise sample are proxying for 
the orders in “stock”, which are not captured by SLS-TPB and SLB-TPS. Our focus variables 
measure the flow of orders within 3 hours prior to the news events. Yet, larger surprises tend to 
trigger not only orders placed just before the announcements but also the ones that were already 
waiting in the books. Since the dataset does not include execution times, estimating the price 
effect of the orders in stock explicitly is not possible, but the bigger news coefficients in the large 
surprise sample provides one possible interpretation of how these orders may factor in to our 
analysis of post-announcement exchange-rate returns.  
The results further suggest that the component of the response mediated through price-
contingent order flow, does not entirely reflect the announcements’ information content. The 
estimated  news  coefficients  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  order  variables  into  the  baseline 
specification. Furthermore, in OLS regressions of news surprises on price-contingent orders, the 
estimated coefficients are all insignificant indicating that these orders do not help predict the 
news (Table 6). Also, the contemporaneous news response estimates reported in Andersen et al. 
(2005) are consistently at the same order of magnitude with those found in this study (Table 4). 
These  findings  suggest  that  price-contingent  orders  can  complement  the  conditional  mean 
specification presented in earlier studies, and also that the part of the price reaction captured by 
these orders are orthogonal to macro news surprises.  
The  coefficient  estimates,  though  substantial,  constitute  a  lower  bound  for  stop-loss 
orders’ price impact. The order series come from a single bank as opposed to the entire bank 
population. Due to this measurement error in the order variable, its coefficient is biased toward 
zero. Theoretically, this also biases the coefficients of the other explanatory variables as well, 
although  in  unknown  directions.  However,  in  this  case,  the  stability  of  the  news  surprise 
coefficients over various different specifications, indicate that measurement error in the order 
variable  is  not  a  significant  source  of  bias  in  other  right-hand  variable  estimates.  Similar 
measurement error concerns might also arise for news surprise variables. However, as long as the 
incorrectly measured variables are uncorrelated with each other, their coefficient estimates are   13 
attenuated (Garber and Klepper (1980)). Hence, orthogonality of news variables to order flow 
suggests that there is attenuation bias in the estimated order coefficients. 
B. Absolute Returns 
There is a sizable exchange-rate jump subsequent to news announcements as noted in 
Cheung and Chinn (2000) and Andersen et al. (2003). This is also documented in our sample in 
Figure  4,  which  plots  mean  absolute  returns  in  each  5-minute  interval  of  the  day,  averaged 
separately across announcement and no-announcement days.  
In this section, I test whether the price-contingent order effect found in first moments also 
exists in second moments as well. I estimate how much the types of orders placed before a news 
announcement contributes to the size of the ensuing exchange-rate jump. A stop-loss order is a 
conditional instruction for the dealer to follow the market trend whereas a take-profit order is an 
instruction to go against it. Therefore, regardless of the sign, stop orders, on average, should be 
associated with larger exchange-rate moves and take-profit orders with smaller exchange rate 
moves.  
The baseline model, which treats the news surprise size as the only source of exchange-
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Here, SLt and TPt denote the excess stop-loss and take-profit orders placed within 3 hours before 
the announcement time. OLS regressions and standard errors are calculated with Newey-West 
correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
Table 7 contains the news surprise coefficients from the baseline model. The estimates 
show that the unanticipated component of the macronews releases explains 21 percent of the 
variation in absolute exchange-rate returns. News about payroll employment, in particular, has 
the largest price impact among all 8:30 announcements, a finding confirmed by the previous 
literature. The table also includes the Andersen et al. (2003) estimates of the contemporaneous 
volatility response to news. Despite the modeling and time period differences
10, these estimates 
                                                 
10 Andersen et al. (2003) proxies the intraday exchange-rate volatility by the absolute value of the residuals from a regression of 
5-minute returns on lagged returns and news surprise variables. They, then, estimate “5-minute exchange-rate volatility as driven 
partly by the volatility over the day containing the 5-minute interval in question, partly by news Skt, and partly by a calendar 
effect pattern consisting largely of intraday effects that capture the high-frequency rhythm of deviations of intraday volatility 
from the daily average”. Their findings are based on interbank dealer data spanning 1992-1998.  
(5)  
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provide  a  useful  benchmark  for  comparing  news  surprise  coefficients  and  confirm  that  our 
control variable estimates are similar in magnitude to the coefficients they report. 
Order-augmented  specification  in  Table  7  shows  that  stop-loss  orders  are  positively 
correlated with the size of the ensuing exchange-rate jump. An additional unit of stop-loss order 
placed within 3 hours prior to the news release increases the absolute returns by 0.016 percent. 
Take-profit  orders,  on  the  other  hand,  are  found  to  be  statistically  insignificant.  This  is  not 
surprising in light of the absence of any tendency for agents to intensify the placement of these 
orders before the news. Here, too, the coefficients of order variables are biased towards zero due 
to the measurement error in the explanatory variables. 
The interaction coefficients in Table 7 provide further support for the observation that 
price-contingent orders are most influential when the news is most surprising. The adjusted R
2 of 
the baseline, augmented and the interactions models are 0.21, 0.24 and 0.32 respectively. This 
implies that, on average, stop-loss order placement in the hours preceding news events enhance 
our ability to explain post-release exchange-rate volatility by 14 percent. Once the interaction 
between surprise size and stop-loss orders are taken into account, this figure rises to 52 percent 
(due to the 0.11 increase over the baseline goodness of fit).  
Orthogonality of macro news surprises to the order variables is still valid in the context of 
absolute returns (Table 8). There is no significant change to the direction or the magnitude of the 
news effects when order variables are included to the baseline specification providing further 
support for this claim.  
C. How long does the price-contingent order effect persist? 
The analysis so far has demonstrated that the surge in stop-loss order placement in the 
hours preceding news events explains the immediate post-release exchange-rate returns. In this 
section, I examine how long this effect lasts by focusing on cumulative returns. To measure 
persistence,  I  replace  the  dependent  variable  in  equation  (3)  with  15,  30,  45  and  60-minute 
cumulative returns, respectively (Table 9). I find that the price effect of stop-loss sell orders is at 
its peak at the 30-minute horizon disappearing only after 45 minutes.  
I also test whether large surprises, which are more likely to entail price cascades, are 
associated with prolonged stop-loss order effects, by estimating the cumulative returns going 
forward in the large and small surprise sample separately (Table 10a and 10b). The results reveal 
that the stop-loss sell orders have a substantial effect on cumulative returns beyond two hours 
when news are most surprising. For small surprise events, the price impact of orders disappears   15 
much more quickly, after half an hour. This highlights the role that stop-loss trading can play in 
producing persistent price effects in currency markets.   
5.   Is there an asymmetric response to macro news releases? 
Throughout the analysis, there is a recurring observation: While the coefficients of net 
stop-loss sell orders are significant both economically and statistically, stop-loss buy orders have 
negligible price impact. Normally, both order types, buys and sells, should be contributing to the 
subsequent  exchange  rate  move  symmetrically  since  exactly  the  same  price  adjustment 
mechanism puts the chain of events into motion, which eventually triggers the orders.  
In this section, I will discuss why the estimated coefficients reveal such an asymmetry. 
Part of the reason can be attributed to the macroeconomic developments of the period under 
analysis. The dataset used here spans September 8, 1999 through April 11, 2000 and June 12, 
2001 through September 20, 2002, which includes both the expansion and the recession times of 
the U.S. economy
11. After the first quarter of 2001, the U.S. economy went into a recession 
period. During this time, pound (along with the Swiss Frank) appeared as a safer alternative to 
the US dollar, creating an increase in demand for the sterling.  
While there have been some fluctuations in the parity consistent with growth forecast and 
productivity growth differentials between the United Kingdom and the United States, the pound 
continued its strength vis-à-vis the dollar in the interval studied here (BIS 2004). Since 2/3
rd of 
the days in the dataset overlaps with the US recessionary period, on average, more stop-loss sell 
orders  could  be  triggered  during  this  time  than  stop-loss  buys  orders.  Furthermore,  bank’s 
customers placed more stop-loss sell orders compared to stop-loss buys to protect themselves 
from the declining value of the dollar (Table 2a and 2b). Hence, the previous regression results 
might merely reflect this asymmetry in the dataset.  
An alternative explanation to the question of why the price impact of stop-loss sell orders 
is larger compared to stop-loss buy orders lies in the news asymmetry literature (Conrad et al., 
2001;  Veronesi,  1999;  Barberis  et  al.1998).  This  literature  suggests  that  bad  news  in  “good 
times”  should  have  an  unusually  large  impact.  Particularly,  Veronesi’s  rational-expectations 
equilibrium approach to the subject also implies that good news in bad times increases an asset’s 
price but by less than it would in a present-value model due to the increased state risk factor. If 
                                                 
11 I follow the NBER and the Andersen et al. (2005) recession definition, i.e., recession begins when there are three 
consecutive monthly declines in non-farm payroll employment and ends when there are three consecutive monthly 
increases in non-farm payroll employment. The recession dates remain unchanged if industrial production is used 
instead of the payroll employment statistics as the definition variable.   16 
so, then the Veronesi model explains why we see significant coefficients associated with stop-
loss  sell  orders  but  not  with  stop-loss  buy  orders  in  this  particular  sample,  which  is 
predominantly composed of recessionary days. Furthermore, another testable implication of this 
model is that if bad news in good times lead to unusually large initial price reaction, then this 
would translate into more stop-loss sell orders being triggered and more exchange-rates to be 
crossed,  hence  resulting  in  a  larger  estimated  coefficient  for  stop-loss  sell  orders  in  the 
expansionary times than in recessionary times. 
To test the validity of these two arguments, I partition the dataset into two based on the 
recession  beginning  date,  February  28,  2001,  reported  by  the  NBER  and  define  a  dummy 
variable Exp which takes on the value 1 if the day is in the expansionary period and zero else. 
Table 11 reports the results from the following regression specification: 
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Expt*Newskt  represents  the  interaction  between  the  expansion  dummy  variable  and  the 
standardized news surprise coefficient associated with announcement k at time t. Expt*SLS-TPBt 
and  Expt*SLB-TPSt capture the effect of the net stop-loss sell and buy orders on a given day in 
the expansionary period. The other variables’ definition remains the same as in the previous 
specifications.  
           The  results  show  that  an  additional  unit  of  stop-loss  sell  order  depreciates  the  dollar 
against the pound by 0.03 percent in expansionary times (Table 11). Although the corresponding 
figure is smaller for the recession sample (0.02 percent) as predicted by the Veronesi model, the 
difference  is  not  statistically  significant.  Hence,  there  is  no  evidence  of  news  asymmetry 
reflected on the price-contingent order coefficients. Similarly, there is no significant difference 
between the expansion and recession coefficients associated with news variables aside from the 
trade balance announcement, which is larger in the expansion period. This is understandable 
since  during  expansionary  times  imports  tend  to grow.  Hence,  a  narrower  trade  deficit  than 
expected during periods of economic growth might surprise investors more than it would in 
recessionary times leading to a larger appreciation. 
Stop-loss buy order coefficients become statistically significant at the 5% level and are of 
the  same  magnitude  as  their  stop-loss  sell  counterparts  in  the  expansion  sub-sample.    As 
predicted by the news asymmetry models, the stop-loss buy orders’ contribution to post-release   17 
price movements remains negligible in the recession period.  Hence, the Veronesi approach may 
provide an explanation for the weak price impact of the stop-loss buy orders: The recession days 
outnumber the expansion days in the sample, and therefore, the full sample specifications do not 
reflect significant coefficients for the stop-loss buy orders.  
In conclusion, the evidence regarding the presence of asymmetric response to news in the 
pound/dollar market is mixed: The news asymmetry explains well the weak price impact of stop-
loss  buy  orders  in  the  full  sample  and  the  strong  price  effect  of  the  same  variable  in  the 
expansion  sub-sample.  On  the  other  hand,  the  presence  of  an  asymmetric  response  to  news 
necessitates that the stop-loss sell orders effect be larger in the expansion sample compared to 
the recession sample (since the arrival of bad news in “good times” trigger stop-loss sell orders, 
which in turn should have an unusually large impact). However, the findings of this study do not 
support the last argument. Furthermore, the asymmetry captured directly by the news surprise 
coefficients themselves is also negligible. This is in line with the findings of Andersen et al. 
(2003), who show that the evidence for news asymmetry in currency markets is weak. 
6.   Robustness Checks 
The significance of stop-loss orders is not limited to the three-hour interval discussed 
above. The price effect of orders placed within 4, 5 and 6 hours prior to the announcement time 
still remains significant. Yet, stop-loss orders placed within 3 hours prior to the announcement 
time have the largest statistically significant impact on the return size (Figure 5). After three 
hours, the effect dies out gradually, becoming statistically insignificant at the 24-hour interval. It 
is not surprising that the stop order placement three and four hours prior to the news release has 
the  largest  impact  on  the  return  size:  In  this  study,  the  currency  pair  under  analysis  is  the 
dollar/pound, and the majority of the order submission in preparation for the 8:30 EST U.S. 
macro news events takes place during the busy London morning hours, which correspond to the 
significant intervals mentioned above. Stop-loss orders placed within one hour and within two 
hours  prior  to  the  announcement  time,  however,  are  consistently  found  to  be  statistically 
insignificant. This is due to the relatively fewer number of orders placed in such short intervals, 
which translate into a lot of zeros in the SLt and TPt series. Similar results apply to the signed 
orders as well (Figure 6). 
The cutoff determining whether an order is far away from the market rate is defined 
earlier as one standard deviation of the absolute daily exchange rate changes. If the distance 
between the requested execution rate and the market rate at the time of the placement exceeds   18 
one standard deviation, that order is considered as a “far” order and therefore, excluded from the 
original sample.  In this section, I investigate the sensitivity of the results to a change in this 
cutoff. If the orders within two standard deviations of the market rate are included in the sample, 
the effect of price-contingent orders decreases in both the absolute return and the signed return 
regressions. This is an expected outcome since less of the orders in the sample will actually be 
executed and hence the overall magnitude and significance of the stop-loss and take-profit orders 
diminishes (Figures 7a, 7b and Figure 8).  If, on the other hand, the orders within half a standard 
deviation of the market rate are included in the sample, the price impact of price contingent 
orders increases (Figures 9a, 9b and Figure 10). This implies that the results reported in the 
earlier sections constitute a lower bound for the effect of price-contingent orders. As the cutoff 
used for filtering out the far orders becomes more and more restrictive, the price impact of stop-
loss orders becomes larger (Table 12), yet the adjusted-R
2 is the highest in regression (3) in 
Table 12 indicating that orders that are placed within one standard deviation from the market rate 
constitute a more appropriate representation of the actually executed orders than the other two 
groups. 
   Another  important  robustness  check  relates  to  the  announcement  sample  used  in  this 
study. Not all announcements generate a statistically significant price impact. This can be due to 
the timing of the announcement or the traders’ belief that news regarding real variables is more 
influential than nominal variables (Cheung and Chinn, 2001). Based on an extensive dataset 
which covers six years, Andersen et al. (2003) find that for the pound/dollar pair, the significant 
8:30 announcements are unemployment, durable goods, trade balance, retail sales, jobless claims 
and GDP advance releases. Therefore, in this study, I focused on these six news items only. This 
is the general practice in the macro news literature where research is primarily concentrated on 
major news releases with significant price impact (Love and Payne, 2002; Chaboud et al., 2004; 
Hautch and Hess, 2001).  
The  question  of  whether  including  all  8:30  announcements  into  the  analysis  would 
change the previous results can arise nonetheless. In theory, this should, on average, reduce the 
magnitude of the stop-loss orders’ effect on post-release returns: Less significant announcements 
imply smaller news surprises, which lead to smaller initial price reactions, which in turn, trigger 
fewer stop-loss orders. Hence, overall, the price impact of stop-loss orders will be more modest 
compared to the results from the significant announcement sample. This dilution effect is indeed 
what Tables 13 and 14 show. The estimated net stop-loss coefficients from both the absolute and 
signed return regressions are smaller and adding the price-contingent order variables increase the   19 
adjusted R
2 by 1% in the signed and by 2% in the absolute return specifications. These are 
smaller increments compared to the previous sections’ findings. Nonetheless, even in samples 
that  include  all  announcement  types,  an  additional  stop-loss  order  placed  before  the 
announcement intensifies the post-release price move by 0.01 percent, which implies that the 
effect is comparable to that of the jobless claims reports announced weekly. 
The effect of price-contingent orders prevails at other U.S. announcement times, too. 
However, only one or two news series are released at those times making it hard to conduct 
statistical analysis with 21 months of order data. At 10:00 EST, a total of five news items are 
released (construction spending, consumer confidence, factory orders, NAPM index and new 
home  sales).    Andersen  et  al.  (2003)  finds  that  out  of  the  five,  only  construction  spending, 
consumer  confidence  and  NAPM  index  have  statistically  significant  price  impact.  Hence,  I 
analyze the effect of price-contingent orders on the days of these three news releases. Table 15 
suggests that an  additional net stop-loss sell order, placed  within an hour of the 10 o’clock 
announcements, tends to depreciate the dollar against the pound by .045 percent. This confirms 
the previous result that price-contingent order flow has substantial effects on post-release returns. 
It is not surprising to see a lower the adjusted R
2 in this case since 10 o’clock announcements are 
less  significant  in  their  price  impact  compared  to  big  news  events  such  as  GDP  or 
unemployment,  which  are  released  at  8:30  EST.  As  before,  estimated  news  coefficients  are 
similar  to  those  reported  in  Andersen  et  al.  (2003)  and  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  order 
variables. 
One might also wonder whether the length of  the sample, which spans a total of 21 
months, is a cause of concern for the validity of the news variable t-statistics since the dataset 
contains 21 observations for each monthly announcement.  As a check on the robustness of the 
results, I also performed all of the empirical work using bootstrapped standard errors with no 
change in any of the qualitative results although the coefficients of advanced GDP were no 
longer significant). 
7.   Conclusion 
In this study, I examine whether the post-release exchange rate movements are linked to 
pre-announcement price-contingent order placements and if so, how much they contribute to the 
following exchange-rate jump. I find that investors with rational timing incentives intensify their 
stop order submissions prior to news releases and that this surge in placement enhances our 
ability to explain the following exchange rate jump by more than half. This particular finding is   20 
relevant  for  improved  high-frequency  volatility  estimation  since  a  better  understanding  of 
conditional mean jumps is essential for modeling purposes. 
In addition, the results reveal that the component of the news response captured by price-
contingent  orders  might  be  independent  of  the  announcement’s  information  content.  This 
suggests that news-induced price-contingent order placements can have significant impact on 
exchange-rates  without  necessarily  conveying  incremental  information  about  the  state  of  the 
macroeconomy. 
The results also extend the recent findings in the exchange-rate literature, which suggest 
that order flow volatility remains elevated hours even days after the macronews announcements 
(Andersen et al. 2003, Evans and Lyons 2005). According to these studies, investors continue to 
evaluate  and  interpret  the  new  information  by  carrying  out  post-announcement  transactions. 
Since  investors  can  use  price-contingent  orders  to  prepare  for  scheduled  announcements 
conditional  on  the  outcome  and  take  positions  accordingly  in  advance,  an  increase  in  the 
placement of these orders might be associated with reduced order flow volatility following the 
news  releases.  Exploring  this  relationship  between  price-contingent  orders  and  post-
announcement volatility persistence will be the prime candidate for future research.   21 
References  
Admati, A. R., Pfleiderer, P., 1988. A theory of intraday trading patterns: volume  
and price variability. Review of Financial Studies 1, 3-40. 
Andersen, T.G., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F., Vega, C., 2003. Micro effects of macro  
announcements:  real-time  price  discovery  in  foreign  exchange.  American    Economic 
Review 93, 38-62. 
Andersen, T.G., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F., Vega, C., 2005. Real-time price discovery in  
stock, bond and foreign exchange markets. NBER Working Paper 11312. 
Balduzzi, P., Elton, E., Green, C., 2001. Economic news and the yield curve: evidence  
from the U.S. treasury market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 523-
543. 
Bank for International Settlements, 2004. Triennial central bank survey of foreign  
exchange and derivatives market activity in april 2004.Publication of the Monetary and 
Economic Department, BIS. 
Bacchetta, P., van Wincoop, E., 2004. A scapegoat model of exchange rate fluctuations.    
NBER Working Paper 10245, January. 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal  
of FinancialEconomics, 49, 307-343. 
Bensaid, B., DeBandt, O., 2000. Les strategies “stop-loss”: Theorie et application au  
contrat notionnel du matif, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 0, 21-56. 
Bessembinder, H., 1994. Bid-ask spreads in the interbank foreign exchange market,  
Journal of Financial Economics,35, 317-348. 
Carlson, J.A. and M. Lo, 2004. One minute in the life of the DM/$: public information in an 
electronic market., forthcoming, Journal of International Money and Finance. 
Chaboud, A. P., Chernenko, S. V., Howorka, E., Krishnasami Iyer, R.S., Liu D., Wright, J.H., 
2004. The high-frequency effects of U.S. macroeconomic data releases on prices and 
trading activity in the global interdealer foreign exchange market. Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers 823. 
Cheung, Y. W.,Chinn, M. D., 2001. Currency traders and exchange rate dynamics: a  
survey of theU.S.market. Journal of International Money and Finance 20, 439-471. 
Conrad, J., Cornell, B., Landsman, W., 2001. When is bad news really bad news?  
Working Paper, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
Cornell, B.,1982. Money supply announcements, interest rates, and foreign 
Exchange. Journal of International Money and Finance, 1: 201-208. 
DeLong, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L.H.and Waldmann R.J., 1990. Positive feedback   
investment strategies and destabilizing rational speculation. The Journal of Finance 54, 
379-395. 
Dybvig, P.H., 1988. Inefficient dynamic portfolio strategies or how to throwaway a  
million dollars in the stock market. The Review of Financial Studies 1, 67-88. 
Easley, D., O’ Hara, M., 1991. Order form and information in securities markets. Journal  
of Finance 46, 905-927. 
Ederington, L., Lee, J., 1995. The short-run dynamics of price adjustment to new  
information. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30, 117-134. 
Engel, C., Frankel, J, 1984. Why interest rates react to money announcements: An answer  
from the foreign exchange market, Journal of Monetary Economics, 13: 31-39. 
Evans, M. D., Lyons, R. K., 2003. How is macro news transmitted to exchange rates?  
NBER Working Paper 9433, January. 
   22 
Evans, M. D., Lyons, R. K., 2005. Do currency markets absorb news quickly? Journal of 
International Money and Finance 24, 197-217. 
Fleming, M., Remolona, E., 1999. Price formation and liquidity in the U.S. treasury  
market. Journal of Finance 54, 1901-1915. 
Foucault, T., 1999. Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order  
market. Journal of Financial Markets 2, 99-134. 
Garber, S., Klepper, S., 1980. Extending the classical normal errors-in-variables model.    
Econometrica 48, No. 6, 1541-1546. 
Glosten, L., Milgrom, P., 1985. Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist market  
with heterogeneously informed agents. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71-
100. 
Goodhart, C., Hall, S., Henry, S., Pesaran, B., 1993. News effects in a high-frequency  
model of the sterling-dollar exchange rate. Journal of Applied Econometrics 8, 1-
13.  
Grinblatt, Mark, Keloharju, M., 2000. What makes investors trade? Yale  
International Center for FinanceWorking Paper No. 00-02. 
Hakkio C., Pearce, D., 1985. The reaction of exchange rates to economic news, Economic  
Inquiry, 23: 621-635.  
Hardouvelis, G., 1988. Economic news, exchange rates, and interest rates, Journal of  
International Money and Finance, 7: 23-25. 
Harris, L., 1998. Optimal dynamic order submission strategies in some stylized trading  
problems. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instriments 7, 1-75. 
Hasbrouck, J., 1991. Measuring the information content of stock trades. Journal of  
Finance 46, 179-207.  
Hautsch, N., Hess D., 2001. A mean variance king?Creation and resolution of uncertainty  
under theemployment report’s reign. Working paper, University of Konstanz. 
Ito, T., Roley V., 1987. News from the U.S. and Japan: Which moves the yen/dollar  
exchange rate? Journal of Monetary Economics, 19: 255-277. 
Klein, M., 1991. Managing the dollar: has the Plaza Agreement mattered? Journal of  
Money, Credit, and Banking 23, 742–751. 
Krugman, P., Miller, M., 1993. Why have a target zone? Carnegie Rochester Conference  
Series on Public Policy 38, 279-314. 
Love, R., Payne, R., 2002. Macroeconomic news, order flows, and exchange rates.  
Typescript, London School of Economics, December. 
Lyons, R.K., 2001. The  Microstructure  Approach  to  Exchange  Rates. MIT Press,  
Cambridge, MA (chapters at faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lyons). 
Odean,T., 1998. Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? Journal of Finance 53,  
1775-1798. 
O’Hara, Maureen, 1995, Market Microstructure Theory (Blackwell Publishers Ltd.,  
Oxford). 
Osler, C.L., 2003. Currency orders and exchange-rate dynamics: an explanation for the  
predictive success of technical analysis. Journal of Finance, 58(5), 1791-1820. 
Osler, C.L., 2005. Stop-loss orders and price cascades in currency markets. Journal of  
International Money and Finance. 24, 219-241. 
Osler, C.L., Savaser, T., 2004. Currency orders and exchange rate kurtosis. Working  
Paper, Brandeis University. 
Payne, R., 2003. Informed trade in spot foreign exchange markets: an empirical analysis.  
Journal  of International Economics 61, 307-329. 
   23 
Shefrin, Hersh, Statman M., 1985. The disposition to sell winners too early and ride  
losers too long: Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance 40, 777-791. 
Veronesi, P., 1999. Stock market overreaction to bad news in good times: a rational  
expectations equilibrium model. Review of Financial Studies, 12, 975-1007. 
 
   24 
Table 1:  U.S. News Announcements 
The table lists the US macroeconomic news announcements that are released at 8:30 EST over September 
8, 1999 through April 11, 2000 and June 12, 2001 through September 20, 2002. 
Announcement  Frequency  Source
1  Units
2 
1- GDP (Advance)*  Quarterly   BEA  % change qoq 
2- GDP (Preliminary)  Quarterly   BEA  % change qoq 
3- GDP (Final)  Quarterly   BEA  % change qoq 
4- Nonfarm Payroll Employment*  Monthly  BLS  Thousands 
5- Retail Sales*  Monthly  BC  Change % 
6- Durable Goods Orders*  Monthly  BC  Change % 
7- Business Inventories  Monthly  BC  Change % 
8- Trade Balance*  Monthly  BEA  $ Billions 
9- Producer Price Index  Monthly  BLS  Change % 
10- Consumer Price Index  Monthly  BLS  Change % 
11- Housing Starts  Monthly  BC  Millions of units 
12- Index of Leading Indicators  Monthly  CB  Change % 
13- Personal Consumption   Monthly  BEA  Change % 
14- Personal Income  Monthly  BEA  Change % 
15- Initial Unemployment Claims*  Weekly  ETA  Thousands 
1Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Bureau of the Census (BC), Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 
Conference Board (CB), Employment and Training Administration (ETA) 
2 Expressed at an annualized rate. 
*Asterisks refer to the announcements that are included in the significant announcement sample in this 
study. The selection is based on whether Andersen et al. (2003) found statistically significant price impact 
associated with the given news item.   25 
Table 2.a:  Descriptive Information on Stop-Loss and Take-Profit Orders 
The table describes the stop-loss and take-profit orders for the pound-dollar currency pair processed by a 
major foreign exchange dealing bank over September 8, 1999 through April 11, 2000 and June 12, 2001 
through September 20, 2002. There are 10,413 orders with aggregate value in excess of $61 billion. 
  All Orders  Stop-Loss  Take-Profit 
Number Orders  10,413  5,020  5,393 
Share of Orders  100.0  48.2  51.8 
Size ($ Mill.):         Mean 







Dist. To Mkt. (%): Mean 







Share of buy orders (%)  52  47  56 




Table 2.b:  Descriptive Information on Stop-Loss and Take-Profit Orders 
(Excluding Far Orders) 
The table describes the stop-loss and take-profit orders that lie within one standard deviation of the daily 
market rate for the pound-dollar currency pair processed by a major foreign exchange dealing bank over 
September 8, 1999 through April 11, 2000 and June 12, 2001 through September 20, 2002. The reason for 
focusing on this subset of orders is that only those orders, which are near the market rate can be triggered 
and thus have a high frequency price impact. In this subset, there are 4,281 orders with aggregate value in 
excess of $23 billion. 
  All Orders  Stop-Loss  Take-Profit 
Number Orders  4,281  2,081  2,200 
Share of Orders  100.0  48.61  51.39 
Size ($ Mill.):         Mean 







Dist. To Mkt. (%): Mean 







Share of buy orders (%)  49  43  54 
Share Executed  41.37  37.29  45.23 
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Table 3.a:  Sources of Stop-Loss and Take-Profit Orders  
The table lists the stop-loss and take-profit orders for the pound-dollar currency pair processed by a major 
foreign exchange dealing bank over September 8, 1999 through April 11, 2000 and June 12, 2001 through 
September  20,  2002.  There  are  10,413  orders  with  aggregate  value  in  excess  of  $61  billion.  "Other" 
customer orders are orders from unidentified desks within the bank. "Internal" orders are those placed by 
agents within the bank. 
  Number   











All Orders  10,413  100.0  61.7  100.0 
Customer Orders  6,347    61.0  33.9    54.9 
                     Fin. Inst.                   4,181                     40.2                     22.0                     35.7 
                     Non-Fin. Inst.                   2,109                     20.3                    11.8                     19.1 
                     Other                      57                       0.5                       0.1                       0.1 




Table 3.b:  Sources of Stop-Loss and Take-Profit Orders (Excluding Far Orders) 
The table lists the stop-loss and take-profit orders that lie within one standard deviation of the daily market 
rate for the pound-dollar currency pair processed by a major foreign exchange dealing bank over September 
8, 1999 through April 11, 2000 and June 12, 2001 through September 20, 2002. The reason for focusing on 
this subset of orders is that only those orders, which are near the market rate can be triggered and thus have 
a  high  frequency  price  impact.  There  are  4,281 orders  with  aggregate  value  in  excess  of  $23  billion. 
"Other" customer orders are orders from unidentified desks within the bank. "Internal" orders are those 
placed by agents within the bank. 
  Number   











“All Orders”  4,281  100.0  23.7  100.0 
Customer Orders  2,732    63.8  14.6    61.7 
                     Fin. Inst.                  1,757                     41.0                     9.4                     39.7 
                     Non-Fin. Inst.                  968                     22.6                     5.2                     21.9 
                     Other                       7                       0.2                     0.0                       0.1 
Internal  1,549   36.2  9.1  38.3 
         
“Stop-Loss Orders”  2,084  100.0  11.4  100.0 
Customer Orders  1,213    58.2  6.1    53.5 
                     Fin. Inst.                   974                     46.7                     5.1                     44.7 
                     Non-Fin. Inst.                   238                     11.4                    1.0                     8.8 
                     Other                      1                       0.1                       0.0                       0.0 
Internal  871   41.8  5.3  46.5 
         
“Take-Profit Orders”  2,264  100.0  12.6  100.0 
Customer Orders  1,550    68.5  8.6    68.3 
                     Fin. Inst.  803                     35.5                     4.4                     34.9 
                     Non-Fin. Inst.  741                     32.7                    4.2                     33.4 
                     Other                      6                       0.3                       0.0                       0.0 
Internal  714   31.5  4.0  31.7 
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Table 4:  Impact on Returns: Signed Effects 
The dependent variable is 5-minute Returns, the 5-minute pound-dollar log return from 8:30-8:35. The base 
currency is the dollar. Employment, Durable Goods, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Jobless Claims and GDP 
Advance  represent  the  standardized  news  surprise  variables  corresponding  to  each  major  US 
macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. In regression 2-4, SLS-TPB
 (SLB-TPS)
 denote the 
number of stop-loss sell (buy) orders in excess of take-profit buy (sell) orders placed 3 hours before the 
announcement time. The remaining variables are the interactions between the order variables defined above 
and  the  two  most  significant  news  items—unemployment  and  trade  balance.  Heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The last column presents the contemporaneous news 
response coefficients and R
2 from Andersen et al. (2005). The estimates are based on futures returns from 
1992-2002. 
5-minute Returns  Baseline  News and Orders 
News, Orders, 
Interactions   Orders Only 
Andersen  
et al. (2005) 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5) 
Employment  0.085**  0.085**  0.066**    0.098** 
  (2.09)  (2.03)  (2.45)    (R
2=0.16) 
Durable Goods  0.027  0.027*  0.027*    0.038** 
  (1.61)  (1.78)  (1.73)    (R
2=0.17) 
Trade Balance  0.069***  0.068***  0.073***    0.049** 
  (3.18)  (3.04)  (4.57)    (R
2=0.16) 
Retail Sales  0.042***  0.039***  0.040***    0.042** 
  (3.00)  (2.84)  (2.79)    (R
2=0.15) 
Jobless Claims  -0.013***  -0.012**  -0.013***    -0.017** 
  (-2.64)  (-2.45)  (-2.60)    (R
2=0.04) 
GDP Advance  0.063***  0.068***  0.067***    0.054** 
  (2.70)  (3.17)  (3.01)    (R
2=0.22) 
SLS-TPB    -0.025***  -0.021**  -0.028***   
    (-3.18)  (-2.44)  (-3.19)   
SLB-TPS    0.009  0.007  0.013   
    (1.10)  (0.89)  (1.36)   
Employment x SLS      0.226***     
      (2.57)     
Trade Balance  x SLS      -0.020     
      (-0.67)     
Employment x SLB       -0.019     
      (-0.56)     
Trade Balance  x SLB      0.130***     
      (3.51)     
Adjusted R
2  0.26  0.29  0.40  0.04 
‡ 
N. of Observations  162  162  162  162   
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
‡ Individual R
2’s are given separately for each announcement.  
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Table 5:  Directional Effects: Small vs. Large Surprises 
The dependent variable is 5-minute Returns, the 5-minute pound-dollar log return from 8:30-8:35. The base 
currency is the dollar. Employment, Durable Goods, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Jobless Claims and GDP 
Advance  represent  the  standardized  news  surprise  variables  corresponding  to  each  major  US 
macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. In regression 2 and 4, SLS-TPB
 (SLB-TPS)
 denote the 
number of stop-loss sell (buy) orders in excess of take-profit buy (sell) orders placed 3 hours before the 
announcement  time.  The  sample  is  divided  into  two  depending  on  whether  the  absolute  value  of  the 
weighted standardized news surprises is smaller or larger than the sample median. Heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
  Small Surprise    Large Surprise 
  Baseline  News, Orders    Baseline  News, Orders 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Employment  -‡  -‡    0.113**  0.112** 
  -  -    (2.06)  (1.97) 
Durable Goods    0.003  0.006    0.034*  0.035** 
  (0.24)  (0.42)    (1.81)  (2.02) 
Trade Balance  0.010*  0.009*    0.073*  0.072* 
  (1.70)  (1.74)    (1.85)  (1.71) 
Retail Sales  0.014  0.013    0.044***  0.040*** 
  (0.70)  (0.72)    (2.99)  (2.90) 
Jobless Claims  -0.005  -0.005    -0.021**  -0.019** 
  (-1.34)  (-1.38)    (-2.26)  (-2.12) 
GDP Advance  -‡  -‡    0.066***  0.070*** 
  -  -    (2.81)  (3.21) 
SLS-TPB    -0.008***      -0.049*** 
    (-2.62)      (-4.21) 
SLB-TPS    -0.003      0.007 
    (-0.70)      (0.53) 
Adjusted R
2  0.01  0.06    0.24  0.30 
N. of Observations  81  81     81  81 
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
‡All Employment and GDP Advance announcements during the period under analysis here are associated 
with large news surprises, hence, in the small surprise sample, the these variables are absent. 
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Table 6:  Orthogonality – Signed News and Orders  
The dependent variables, Employment, Durable Goods, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Jobless Claims and 
GDP  Advance,  represent  the  standardized  news  surprise  variables  corresponding  to  each  major  US 
macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. SLS-TPB
 (SLB-TPS)
 denote the total number stop-loss 
sell (buy) orders in excess of take-profit buy (sell) orders placed 3 hours before the announcement time. 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
  SLS-TPB  SLB-TPS  Adjusted R
2  N. of Observations 
Employment  -0.14  -0.01  0.01  21 
  (-0.56)  (-0.02)     
Durable Goods  -0.09  0.18  0.04  20 
  (-0.29)  (0.89)     
Trade Balance  -0.01  0.13  0.02  22 
  (-0.05)  (0.57)     
Retail Sales  0.32  0.28  0.09  21 
  (0.81)  (1.02)     
Jobless Claims  0.11  -0.02  0.01  93 
  (1.24)  (-0.32)     
GDP Advance  0.17  -0.74  0.31  7 
  (0.24)  (-1.57)     
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7:  Contemporaneous Volatility Response   
In regressions 1-4, the dependent variable is Absolute 5-minute Returns, the absolute value of the 5-minute 
pound-dollar  return  from  8:30-8:35.  The  base  currency  is  the  dollar.  Abs_Employment,  Abs_Durable 
Goods, Abs_Trade Balance, Abs_Retail Sales, Abs_Jobless Claims and Abs_GDP Advance represent the 
absolute  values  of  the  standardized  news  surprise  variables  corresponding  to  each  major  US 
macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. SL
 and TP
 denote the number of stop-loss and take-
profit  orders  placed  3  hours  before  the  announcement  time  respectively.  Heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Regression (5) provides the Andersen et al. (2003) 
estimates of the contemporaneous response of exchange-rate volatility to news.  









  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  ( 5 ) 
Abs_Employment  0.074**  0.073**  0.053**    0.058** 
  (2.03)  (2.06)  (2.09)     
Abs_Durable Goods  0.021*  0.014  0.017    0.017** 
  (1.78)  (1.06)  (1.25)     
Abs_Trade Balance  0.030**  0.024*  0.026**    0.023** 
  (2.41)  (1.69)  (1.96)     
Abs_Retail Sales  0.036***  0.034***  0.035***    -
‡ 
  (2.72)  (2.52)  (2.61)     
Abs_Jobless Claims  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004    0.003** 
  (-0.74)  (-0.84)  (-0.72)     
Abs_GDP Advance  0.049**  0.053**  0.050**    -
‡ 
  (2.18)  (2.32)  (2.22)     
SL    0.016***  0.017**  0.017***   
    (2.79)  (1.84)  (2.89)   
TP    0.002  0.001  0.002   
      (0.55)  (1.38)  (0.46)    
Abs_Employment x SL      0.071***     
      (2.74)     
Abs_Durable Goods x SL      -0.001     
      (-0.72)     
Abs_Trade Balance x SL      -0.001     
      (-0.69)     
Abs_Retail Sales x SL      -0.027     
      (-1.25)     
Abs_Jobless Claims x SL      -0.001     
      (-0.71)     
Abs_GDP Advance x SL      0.368     
      (1.02)     
Adjusted R
2  0.21  0.24  0.32  0.04  -
‡ 
N. of Observations  162  162  162  162    
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
‡  The  R
2  and  the  coefficients  of    Abs_Retail  Sales  and  Abs_GDP  Advance  are  missing  from  the 
Andersen et al. (2003) regression as the authors report only four of the major news’ coefficients.  
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Table 8:  Orthogonality – News and Orders   
The dependent variables, Abs_Employment, Abs_Durable Goods, Abs_Trade Balance, Abs_Retail Sales, 
Abs_Jobless  Claims  and  Abs_GDP  Advance,  represent  the  absolute  values  of  the  standardized  news 
surprise variables corresponding to each major US macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. SL
 
and TP
 denote the number of stop-loss and take-profit orders placed 3 hours before the announcement time 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
  SL  TP  Adjusted R
2  N. of Observations 
Abs_Employment  0.35  -0.09  0.00  21 
  (1.39)  (-0.34)     
Abs_Durable Goods  0.38  -0.03  0.07  20 
  (1.44)  (-0.44)     
Abs_Trade Balance  0.23  -0.08  0.08  22 
  (1.27)  (-0.75)     
Abs_Retail Sales  0.04  -0.24  0.00  21 
  (0.28)  (-1.03)     
Abs_Jobless Claims  -0.03  -0.02  0.00  93 
  (-0.36)  (-0.82)     
Abs_GDP Advance  -2.98  0.38  0.00  7 
  (-1.26)  (0.95)     
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 Table 9:  Persistence — Cumulative Returns 
The dependent variables are the cumulative pound-dollar log returns from 8:30-8:45, 8:30-9:00, 8:30-9:15 
and 8:30-9:30. The base currency is the dollar. Employment, Durable Goods, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, 
Jobless Claims and GDP Advance represent the standardized news surprise variables corresponding to each 
major US macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. SLS-TPB
 (SLB-TPS)
 denote the number of 
stop-loss sell (buy) orders in excess of take-profit buy (sell) orders placed 3 hours before the announcement 













Advance SLS-TPB SLB-TPS  Adj-R
2 
15-min  0.067*  0.037*  0.067**  0.043***  -0.01  0.069**  -0.020**  0.008  0.14 
  (1.66)  (1.71)  (2.04)  (3.14)  (-1.54)  (2.02)  (-2.05)  (0.69)   
30-min  0.073  0.063***  0.057  0.055*** -0.019**  0.021  -0.031**  -0.003  0.12 
  (1.36)  (2.77)  (1.55)  (2.85)  (-2.46)  (0.38)  (-2.38)  (-0.14)   
45-min  0.101*  0.055***  0.058  0.058** -0.025***  -0.024  -0.028*  -0.009  0.10 
  (1.73)  (2.76)  (1.54)  (2.36)  (-2.57)  (-0.44)  (-1.86)  (-0.51)   
60-min  0.094  0.044***  0.040  0.038  -0.019*  -0.024  -0.026  -0.011  0.04 
  (1.59)  (2.59)  (0.76)  (1.38)  (-1.63)  (-0.39)  (-1.45)  (-0.48)   
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 10.a:  Cumulative Returns: Large Surprise Sample 
The  dependent  variables  are  pound-dollar  cumulative  log  returns.  The  base  currency  is  the  dollar. 
Employment, Durable Goods, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Jobless Claims and GDP Advance represent the 
standardized  news  surprise  variables  corresponding  to  each  major  US  macroeconomic  announcement 
released at 8:30 EST. SLS-TPB
 (SLB-TPS)
 denote the number of stop-loss sell (buy) orders in excess of 
take-profit buy (sell) orders placed 3 hours before the announcement time. The sample is divided into two 
depending on whether the absolute value of the weighted standardized news surprises is smaller or larger 













Advance SLS-TPB SLB-TPS Adj-R
2 
8:30-8:35  0.112**  0.035**  0.032  0.040***  -0.019**  0.07***  -0.049***  0.007  0.30 
  (1.97)  (2.02)  (0.71)  (2.90)  (-2.12)  (3.21)  (-4.21)  (0.53)   
8:30-8:45  0.080  0.029  0.023  0.041***  -0.006  0.072*  -0.038**  0.010  0.10 
  (1.36)  (1.36)  (0.57)  (3.25)  (-0.48)  (1.92)  (-2.07)  (0.62)   
8:30-9:00  0.109  0.061**  0.002  0.056***  -0.015  0.017  -0.040*  -0.009  0.12 
  (1.55)  (2.37)  (0.05)  (2.77)  (-1.25)  (0.30)  (-1.80)  (-0.40)   
8:30-9:15  0.135*  0.061***  -0.012  0.053**  -0.019  -0.022  -0.051**  -0.009  0.17 
  (1.83)  (2.85)  (-0.30)  (2.36)  (-1.17)  (-0.37)  (-2.23)  (-0.39)   
8:30-9:30  0.122  0.046**  -0.018  0.028  0.000  -0.016  -0.063***  0.000  0.10 
  (1.59)  (2.47)  (-0.36)  (1.14)  (-0.02)  (-0.23)  (-2.65)  (0.01)   
8:30-9:45  0.153**  0.062***  -0.014  0.011  -0.005  -0.017  -0.074***  0.001  0.16 
  (2.19)  (4.06)  (-0.32)  (0.69)  (-0.25)  (-0.17)  (-2.55)  (0.05)   
8:30-10:00  0.139*  0.087***  -0.016  -0.001  -0.025  -0.028  -0.079**  0.011  0.14 
  (1.92)  (4.01)  (-0.32)  (-0.05)  (-0.83)  (-0.31)  (-2.48)  (0.45)   
8:30-10:15  0.117*  0.056  -0.006  -0.028*  -0.018  -0.023  -0.086***  0.016  0.08 
  (1.85)  (1.54)  (-0.15)  (-1.70)  (-0.45)  (-0.35)  (-3.02)  (0.66)   
8:30-10:30  0.146***  0.065  0.041  -0.028  -0.024  0.014  -0.090***  0.004  0.11 
  (2.62)  (1.51)  (0.92)  (-1.19)  (-0.48)  0.24)  (-3.28)  (0.13)   
8:30-10:45  0.140**  0.057  0.031  -0.04  -0.003  0.076  -0.063**  -0.016  0.04 
  (2.01)  (0.97)  (0.52)  (-1.53)  (-0.06)  (0.96)  (-2.02)  (-0.43)   
8:30-11:00  0.130  0.080  0.023  -0.047  -0.019  0.04  -0.065*  -0.008  0.02 
  (1.62)  (1.44)  (0.32)  (-1.16)  (-0.37)  (0.68)  (-1.85)  (-0.21)   













Claims  SLS-TPB  SLB-TPS  Adj-R
2 
8:30-8:35  0.006  0.009*  0.013  -0.005  -0.008***  -0.003  0.06 
  (0.42)  (1.74)  (0.72)  (-1.38)  (-2.62)  (-0.70)   
8:30-8:45  0.097***  0.047  0.137  -0.015  -0.005  -0.007  0.06 
  (4.48)  (1.51)  (1.00)  (-1.56)  (-0.73)  (-0.60)   
8:30-9:00  0.080**  0.071*  0.059  -0.021  -0.023**  -0.013  0.05 
  (2.87)  (1.81)  (0.32)  (-1.71)  (-2.26)  (-0.81)   
8:30-9:15  0.002  0.083*  0.269  -0.039**  -0.011  -0.021  0.03 
  (0.04)  (1.92)  (1.07)  (-2.45)  (-0.66)  (-1.14)   
8:30-9:30  0.009  0.058  0.390  -0.049***  -0.002  -0.003  0.02 
  (-0.20)  (0.95)  (1.63)  (-2.71)  (-0.10)  (-1.04)   
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
‡All Employment and GDP Advance announcements during the period under analysis here are associated 
with large news surprises, hence, in the small surprise sample, the these variables are absent. 
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Table 11:  Directional Effects: Is there an asymmetric response? 
The dependent variable is 5-minute Returns, the 5-minute pound-dollar log return from 8:30-8:35. The base 
currency is the dollar. Employment, Durable Goods, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Jobless Claims and GDP 
Advance  represent  the  standardized  news  surprise  variables  corresponding  to  each  major  US 
macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. In regression 1 and 2, SLS-TPB
 (SLB-TPS)
 denotes 
the number of stop-loss sell (buy) orders in excess of take-profit buy (sell) orders placed 3 and 4 hours 
before the announcement time respectively. Exp is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for days 
within the expansionary period. The dataset spans September 8, 1999 through April 11, 2000 and June 12, 
2001  through  September  20.Days  following  February  28,  2001constitute  the  recessionary  period. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
5-minute Returns   
Exp x Employment  0.079* 
  (1.82) 
Exp xDurable Goods  0.045** 
  (2.12) 
Exp xTrade Balance  0.123*** 
  (2.62) 
Exp x Retail Sales  -0.046 
  (-0.56) 
Exp x Jobless Claims  0.012 
  (0.61) 
Exp x GDP Advance  0.035 
  (0.28) 
Employment  0.086* 
  (1.93) 
Durable Goods  0.033* 
  (1.90) 
Trade Balance  0.020 
  (0.76) 
Retail Sales  0.043*** 
  (2.96) 
Jobless Claims  -0.017*** 
  (-3.20) 
GDP Advance  0.074*** 
  (4.05) 
Exp x SLS-TPB  -0.030** 
  (-2.03) 
SLS-TPB  -0.022** 
  (-2.37) 
Exp x SLB-TPS  0.031** 
  (2.41) 
SLB-TPS  -0.003 
   (-0.27) 
Adjusted R
2  0.25 
N. of Observations  162 
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 12:  Robustness Checks: Far vs. Near Orders 
The dependent variable is 5-minute Returns, the 5-minute pound-dollar log return from 8:30-8:35. The base 
currency is the dollar. Employment, Durable Goods, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Jobless Claims and GDP 
Advance  represent  the  standardized  news  surprise  variables  corresponding  to  each  major  US 
macroeconomic announcement released at 8:30 EST. SLS-TPB
 (SLB-TPS)
 denote the number of stop-loss 
sell (buy) orders in excess of take-profit buy (sell) orders placed 3 hours before the announcement time. 
Regressions 2, 3 and 4 use price continent orders from three different samples, those that are placed within 
half,  one  and  two  standard  deviations  of  the  daily  market  rate  respectively.  Heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
5-minute Returns  Baseline  Cutoff=0.5*σ  Cutoff=σ  Cutoff=2*σ 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Employment  0.085**  0.080**  0.085**  0.085** 
  (2.09)  (2.02)  (2.03)  (2.02) 
Durable Goods  0.027  0.027*  0.027*  0.028* 
  (1.61)  (1.45)  (1.78)  (1.78) 
Trade Balance  0.069***  0.065***  0.068***  0.064*** 
  (3.18)  (3.02)  (3.04)  (3.16) 
Retail Sales  0.042***  0.041***  0.039***  0.041*** 
  (3.00)  (3.11)  (2.84)  (2.98) 
Jobless Claims  -0.013***  -0.013**  -0.012**  -0.011** 
  (-2.64)  (-2.34)  (-2.45)  (-2.39) 
GDP Advance  0.063***  0.063***  0.068***  0.068*** 
  (2.70)  (2.67)  (3.17)  (2.83) 
SLS-TPB    -0.029**  -0.025***  -0.013*** 
    (-2.08)  (-3.18)  (-1.94) 
SLB-TPS    -0.011  0.009  0.003 
      (-0.61)  (1.11)  (0.69) 
Adjusted R
2  0.26  0.28  0.29  0.27 
N. of Observations  162  162  162  162 
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
   36 
Table 13:  Robustness Checks: All Announcements 
Absolute 5-minute Returns  Baseline     3 hours     4 hours 
  (1)     (2)     (3) 
Abs_Employment  0.076**    0.076**    0.075** 
  (2.09)    (2.13)    (2.08) 
Abs_CPI  -0.005    -0.005    -0.007 
  (-0.73)    (-0.73)    (-1.03) 
Abs_Durable Goods  0.024*    0.02    0.023* 
  (1.89)    (1.39)    (1.69) 
Abs_Housing Starts  -0.007    -0.008    -0.008 
  (-1.37)    (-1.52)    (-1.62) 
Abs_Leading Indicators  0.004    0.005    0.003 
  (0.81)    (1.17)    (0.57) 
Abs_Trade Balance  0.033    0.031**    0.032*** 
  (1.55)    (2.32)    (2.52) 
Abs_PPI  0.029**    0.031**    0.027** 
  (2.05)    (2.28)    (1.85) 
Abs_Retail Sales  0.035***    0.034***    0.035*** 
  (3.09)    (2.97)    (2.95) 
Abs_Business Inventories  -0.003    0.000    0.000 
  (-0.61)    (-0.03)    (-0.04) 
Abs_Pers. Consumption Expenditures  -0.015***    -0.014**    -0.015** 
  (-2.58)    (-2.18)    (-2.41) 
Abs_Personal Income  0.039*    0.033    0.036* 
  (1.87)    (1.50)    (1.70) 
Abs_Jobless Claims  0.000    0.000    0.000 
  (-0.06)    (0.03)    (-0.09) 
Abs_GDP Advance  0.054**    0.058**    0.055** 
  (2.35)    (2.45)    (2.27) 
Abs_GDP Preliminary  0.015*    0.01    0.008 
  (1.63)    (0.93)    (0.78) 
Abs_GDP Final  0.008    0.012    0.011 
  (0.96)    (1.32)    (1.22) 
SL      0.010***    0.006** 
      (2.56)    (1.95) 
TP      0.002    0.000 
         (0.90)     (0.09) 
Adjusted R
2  0.21    0.23    0.23 
N. of Observations  240     240     240 
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 14:  Robustness Checks: All Signed Announcements 
5-minute Returns  Baseline     3 hours     4 hours 
  (1)     (2)     (3) 
Employment  0.080**    0.080**    0.081** 
  (2.02)    (-2.00)    (-2.04) 
CPI  0.005    0.004    0.007 
  (0.86)    (0.66)    (1.08) 
Durable Goods  0.026    0.026    0.026 
  (1.49)    (1.56)    (1.55) 
Housing Starts  0.003    -0.002    0.003 
  (0.38)    (-0.25)    (0.31) 
Leading Indicators  -0.004    -0.003    -0.017 
  (-0.84)    (-0.57)    (-1.31) 
Trade Balance  0.068***    0.068***    0.068*** 
  (3.00)    (2.96)    (2.82) 
PPI  -0.012    -0.010    -0.013 
  (-0.68)    (-0.54)    (-0.72) 
Retail Sales  0.041***    0.040***    0.041*** 
  (2.86)    (2.78)    (2.92) 
Business Inventories  -0.003    -0.004    -0.004 
  (-0.27)    (-0.45)    (-0.43) 
Personal Consumption Expenditures  -0.008    -0.005    -0.007 
  (-0.82)    (-0.49)    (-0.61) 
Personal Income  -0.013    -0.009    -0.014 
  (-0.82)    (-0.40)    (-0.62) 
Jobless Claims  -0.012**    -0.012**    -0.011** 
  (-2.26)    (-2.24)    (-2.12) 
GDP Advance  0.061***    0.064***    0.061*** 
  (2.52)    (2.79)    (2.54) 
GDP Preliminary  0.012    0.011    0.016 
  (0.63)    (0.49)    (0.72) 
GDP Final  -0.009    -0.008    -0.007 
  (-0.57)    (-0.48)    (-0.44) 
SLS-TPB      -0.010*    -0.008* 
      (-1.72)    (-1.87) 
SLB-TPS      0.005    -0.001 
         (0.69)     (-0.22) 
Adjusted R
2  0.21    0.22    0.22 
N. of Observations  240     240     240 
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 15:  Robustness Checks: 10:00 EST Announcements 
5-minute Returns  Benchmark 
Orders placed 
within 1 hr 
Orders placed  
within 2 hrs 
Orders placed 
within 3 hrs 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Construction Spending  0.025**  0.026**  0.027**  0.025** 
  (2.16)  (2.02)  (2.12)  (2.11) 
Consumer Confidence    0.028**  0.035**  0.034**  0.031** 
  (2.29)  (2.35)  (2.30)  (2.29) 
NAPM Index   0.020  0.020  0.012  0.020 
  (1.21)  (1.17)  (0.55)  (1.17) 
SLS-TPB    -0.045**  -0.031  -0.025 
    (-2.00)  (-1.50)  (-1.43) 
SLB-TPS    -0.002  -0.001  0.000 
    (-0.13)  (-0.53)  (0.06) 
Adjusted R
2  0.05  0.06  0.03  0.03 
N. of Observations  44  44  44  44 
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Construction spending is measured as % change, consumer confidence and NAPM (National Association of 
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Figure 1:  Intraday Pattern of Price-Contingent Orders 
This figure shows the number of price-contingent orders placed in each hour preceding and following 
8:30EST, averaged across all announcement days versus the benchmark (days with no announcements). 





















































Figure 2:  Intraday Pattern of Stop-Loss Orders 
This figure shows the number of stop-loss orders placed in each hour preceding and following 8:30EST, 
averaged across all announcement days versus the benchmark (days with no announcements). The dotted 
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Figure 3:  Intraday Pattern of Take-Profit Orders 
This figure shows the number of take-profit orders placed in each hour preceding and following 8:30EST, 
averaged across all announcement days versus the benchmark (days with no announcements). The dotted 











































Figure 4:  Intraday Pattern of Exchange-Rate Volatility  
This  figure  plots  the  absolute  returns  in  each  5-minute  interval  of  the  day,  averaged  across  all 
announcement days in the sample versus the benchmark (days with no announcements). The thin line 
represents the benchmark. To avoid contamination from shifts in and out of day light saving time, the 
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Figure 5:  Impact on Return Size: Stop-Loss Orders 
Figure 5 and 6 plot the estimated stop-loss and take-profit order slope coefficients respectively against the 
associated interval, h, from the regression equation: 
6
1
| | | | t k kt sl t tp t t kt
k
R D News SL TP α β β β ε
=
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Figure 6:  Impact on Returns: Directional Effects 
Figure 6 plots the estimated coefficients of stop-loss sell orders (net of take-profit buys) against the 
associated hourly time window, h, from the signed returns regression equation: 
6
1
( ) ( ) t k kt sls t slb t t kt t t
k
R D News SLS TPB SLB TPS α β β β ε
=
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Figure 7:  Estimated Stop-loss and Take-Profit Coefficients—Very Far Orders 
Figures 7 (a) and (b) plot the estimated stop-loss and take-profit coefficients from the far order sample 
against the associated interval, h, based on the regression equation below, where far orders are those that 
are placed within two  standard deviations away from the daily market rate at the time of the placement. 
6
1
| | | | t k kt sl t tp t t kt
k
R D News SL TP α β β β ε
=
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Figure 8:   Estimated Stop-loss Sell Coefficients—Very Far Orders 
Figure 11 plots the estimated coefficients of stop-loss sell orders (net of take-profit buys) from the far order 
sample against the associated interval, h, based on the regression equation below, where far orders are those 
that are placed within two standard deviations away from the daily market rate at the time of the placement: 
6
1
( ) ( ) t k kt sls t slb t t kt t t
k
R D News SLS TPB SLB TPS α β β β ε
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Figure 9:  Estimated Stop-loss and Take-Profit Coefficients—Very Near Orders 
Figures 8 (a) and (b) plot the estimated stop-loss and take-profit coefficients from the near order sample 
against the associated interval, h, based on the regression equation below, where near orders are those that 
are placed within half a standard deviation away from the daily market rate at the time of the placement: 
6
1
| | | | t k kt sl t tp t t kt
k
R D News SL TP α β β β ε
=
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Figure 10:   Estimated Stop-loss Sell Coefficients—Very Near Orders 
Figure 10 plots the estimated coefficients of stop-loss sell orders (net of take-profit buys) from the near 
order sample against the associated interval, h, based on the regression equation below, where near orders 
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